Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship

5-2016

Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and
Right-of-Publicity Law
Stacey Dogan
Boston Univeristy School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stacey Dogan, Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and Right-of-Publicity Law, 96 Boston University Law Review 1293 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/152

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly
Commons at Boston University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

BULLYING AND OPPORTUNISM IN TRADEMARK AND
RIGHT-OF-PUBLICITY LAW
STACEY DOGAN*

I. NOTICE FAILURE IN THE WHY, WHAT, AND HOW OF TRADEMARK
AND PUBLICITY RIGHTS...................................................................... 1297
A. Why: Ambivalence and Ambiguity about Normative Goals ....... 1298
1. Trademark Law .................................................................... 1299
2. The Right of Publicity .......................................................... 1301
B. What: The Malleability and Subjectivity of RightsDefining Doctrines ..................................................................... 1303
1. Trademark Law .................................................................... 1303
2. Right of Publicity ................................................................. 1306
C. How: Notice Failure in Enforcement Practice ........................... 1312
II. EXACERBATING DOCTRINES AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES .............. 1314
A. Right-of-Publicity Incentives ...................................................... 1314
B. Trademark Doctrine and the Benefits of Sharp Elbows ............. 1316
III. WHAT’S TO BE DONE? ........................................................................ 1322
Lawyers,1 scholars,2 and even Congress3 have lately expressed concern
about so-called “trademark bullies”—trademark holders that assert tenuous
* Professor & Law Alumni Scholar, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to Conor
Walsh for research assistance.
1
See, e.g., Jason Vogel & Jeremy A. Schachter, How Ethics Rules Can Be Used to
Address Trademark Bullying, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 503, 504 (2013) (expressing concern
that “[current] mechanisms may not effectively deter [trademark] bullying at the prelitigation
stage”);
Category
Archives:
Trademark
Bullying,
DUETSBLOG,
http://www.duetsblog.com/trademark-bullying/ [https://perma.cc/5TQF-JF3A] (archiving
law firm blog entries discussing examples of alleged bullying by trademark holders);
Roxana Sullivan & Luke Curran, Trademark Bullying: Defending Your Brand or Vexatious
Business Tactics?, IPWATCHDOG (July 16, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/
07/16/trademark-bullying-defending-your-brand-or-vexatious-business-tactics/id=59155/
[https://perma.cc/MZA7-NR4X] (defining trademark bullies as those who “aggressively
assert rights beyond the scope of trademark protection afforded by the Lanham Act through
the issuance of threating cease-and-desist letters”).
2
E.g., Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 629 (
“[B]ullying is a serious concern, as it has implications far beyond trademark law and
impacts the U.S. economy and the freedom of cultural expression.”); Jessica M. Kiser, To
Bully or Not to Bully: Understanding the Role of Uncertainty in Trademark Enforcement
Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211, 211 (2014) (“Trademark bullying harms
competition and chills free speech interests of those seeking to use trademarks for criticism
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legal claims against vulnerable defendants, who often capitulate rather than
incurring the expense and uncertainty of litigation. At the same time, we’ve
witnessed right-of-publicity claims for acts that never would have raised an
eyebrow a few decades ago.4 Complaints about bullying and overreaching are
largely anecdotal rather than empirical, so it’s hard to gauge the extent of the
behavior and to measure its costs. But the fact that it has attracted so much
attention suggests a perception, at least, that some rights-holders are asserting
unreasonable claims and chilling legitimate conduct.
This Essay contends that certain structural and doctrinal features of
trademark and right-of-publicity law enable and, in some cases, reward
aggressive claiming. Although the two areas of law have different roots and
distinct doctrinal formulations, they share some common features that may fuel
grabby behavior by rights-holders. Normatively, both areas of law have
gravitated toward an unjust enrichment model, which gives trademark holders
and celebrities support for a broad sense of entitlement to the economic value
of their marks and identities.5 At the same time, rights and limiting doctrines
can be vague and indistinct, making extravagant claims hard to reject out of
hand. The law, in other words, has failed in its function of giving notice of
where legal rights end and the public’s right of access begins. Especially in

and parody as permitted by the fair use doctrine.”); Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on
Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 855 (2012)
(expressing concern that “[t]rademark bullying engenders a number of costs for society”);
Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 585, 585 (2008) (explaining that “[t]rademark litigation in America today is
undergoing a profound change” because of “the use of strike suits and the like to deter
market entrants”); Jeremy N. Sheff, Fear and Loathing in Trademark Enforcement, 22
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 873, 873 (2012) (“Much academic commentary
these days concludes that trademark enforcement has become overly aggressive.”).
3
Trademark Technical and Conforming Amendment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-146,
§ 4, 124 Stat. 66, 70 (instructing Secretary of Commerce to report and propose policy
recommendations on “the extent to which small businesses may be harmed by litigation
tactics by corporations attempting to enforce trademark rights beyond a reasonable
interpretation of the scope of the rights granted to the trademark owner”).
4
E.g., Sarver v. Chartier, Nos. 11–56986, 12–55429, 2016 WL 625362, at *10 (9th Cir.
Feb. 17, 2016) (affirming grant of anti-SLAPP motion, in right-of-publicity suit filed by
soldier allegedly depicted in fictional film about troops’ experiences in Iraq); Rosa &
Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp., No. 15-10880, 2016 WL 25495, at *2
(11th Cir. Jan. 4, 2016) (ruling on a right of publicity claim based in part on Target’s sale of
biographical books and movie about Rosa Parks); Marshall v. Nat’l Football League, 787
F.3d 502, 506 (8th Cir. 2015) (“The class action complaint alleges that for many years NFL
Films . . . has used the names, images, likenesses, and identities of former NFL players in its
various videos to generate revenue and promote the NFL.”).
5
See generally Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV.
1328, 1338 (2015) (noting the common view among contemporary commentators “that IP is
some kind of prepolitical right to which inventors and creators are entitled”).
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trademark law, this doctrinal creep is exacerbated by other doctrines that
encourage and reward broad claims of rights.
If vague boundaries and aggression-promoting doctrines have created the
current problem, the solution would seem to lie with restoring clarity and
eliminating rules that reward over-claiming. On both fronts, this is easier said
than done. Although scholars have proposed threshold doctrines to make it
harder to prove a prima facie case,6 courts appear disinclined to adopt them.7
With both trademarks and the right of publicity, judges seem to crave
discretion to decide whether behavior violates the spirit of the law.8 And they
manage this by making the letter of the law a set of flexible, fact-intensive
doctrines that offer little in the way of notice or predictability.9 To make things
worse, trademark law’s rules rewarding boldness are deeply entrenched, and
face little counterweight from ethical and legal rules against over-claiming.10

6
E.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1682-85 (2007) (proposing “trademark use”
requirement in infringement suits); Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant
Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414-16 (2010) (advocating threshold materiality
requirement); Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and
False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1305 (2011) (proposing that courts
reconcile trademark and false advertising law by, among other things, requiring materiality
for both); cf. William McGeveran, The Trademark Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267,
2268 (2010) (suggesting safe harbors to protect certain speech-related uses of trademarks).
7
See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2009)
(rejecting “trademark use” requirement in infringement suits); Bd. of Supervisors for La.
State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 485 (5th Cir. 2008)
(rebuffing a call for materiality: “Whether or not a consumer cares about official
sponsorship is a different question from whether that consumer would likely believe the
product is officially sponsored.”).
8
See generally Stacey L. Dogan, “We Know It When We See It”: Intermediary
Trademark Liability and the Internet, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (“The recent history of
intermediary liability decisions in copyright and trademark law reflects a notable resistance
to rules that might constrain judicial discretion to ferret out bad guys.”); Stacey Dogan,
Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion: A Tale of Two Approaches to Intermediary
Trademark Liability Online, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 503, 503 (2014) (explaining that
current doctrine “resembles a roving unfair completion law, leaving discretion with the fact
finder to assess the intermediary’s culpability in enabling confusion”).
9
See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2013) (endorsing
“transformative use test” in speech-related right-of-publicity in part “because it provides
courts with a flexible—yet uniformly applicable—analytical framework”); Network
Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1148 (9th Cir. 2011)
(noting the need for “flexibility over rigidity” in likelihood of confusion analysis);
Brookfield Commc’ns v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We
must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet context;
emerging technologies require a flexible approach.”).
10
See infra Section II.B. (discussing features of trademark law that encourage aggressive
claiming).
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Given these structural and doctrinal features, it’s no wonder that rightsholders test the limits of their trademark and publicity rights in lawsuits, PTO
practice, and cease-and-desist campaigns. Contrary to the oft-stated trope of
trademark holders, they do not have to take aggressive positions against
borderline conduct to avoid loss of their trademark rights.11 But they can obtain
benefits from taking forceful positions, both in the immediate dispute and more
generally.12 Whether we view them as bullies, opportunists, or rational profitmaximizers, rights-holders are responding to incentives and opportunities
created by judges making substantive law.13
This is not to condone or excuse those who assert untenable claims. The
reality, however, is that few of the claims that critics cite as trademark bullying
are untenable, under today’s permissive standards for infringement and
dilution.14 And the same goes for right-of-publicity claims, even in the context

11
See, e.g., US Mark Owner Bows to Public Opinion in Monster Dispute, WORLD
TRADEMARK
REV.
(Jan.
12,
2009),
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/
Blog/detail.aspx?g=956f08e4-f918-4db7-af2d-09957f7fd842 [https://perma.cc/L8DU-2QJ3]
(quoting CEO of Monster Cable regarding his decision to drop trademark dispute against
Monster Mini Golf: “This is a landmark kind of situation, as public opinion wins over what
is the right thing to do for trademark protection of a famous mark. We have made the
decision that public opinion, and that of our valued customers, is more important than the
letter of the law that requires us to prevent the dilution of our mark or risk losing it.”). See
generally Kiser, supra note 2, at 224-32 (“[T]he actual risk of losing one’s trademark rights
due to a failure to police third party trademark use appears to be highly exaggerated.”).
12
Such strategies can backfire, of course; as Leah Chan Grinvald has pointed out, public
shaming can sometimes offer a powerful rebuke to trademark bullies. See Grinvald, supra
note 2, at 625 (examining the “use of shaming by small businesses and individuals to defend
themselves against a trademark bully”).
13
Cf. Kiser, supra note 2, at 218 (“Thus, trademark bullying can only rarely be described
as meritless and is often better described as unnecessary, inefficient and economically
irrational.”).
14
Indeed, in one of the most commonly-cited examples of purported bullying, the US
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) initially agreed with the alleged bully. The PTO at
first rejected Bo Muller-Moore’s application for EAT MORE KALE, on the basis that it was
likely to be confused with Chick-fil-A’s EAT MOR CHICKIN mark. See Letter from
Andrew D. Lawrence, Managing Attorney, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 108, to Daniel
P. Richardson, Attorney for Applicant Robert Muller-Moore (Mar. 7, 2013),
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn85412053&docId=OOA20130307115404#
docIndex=26&page=1 [https://perma.cc/ES4R-536B] (“Registration was refused as to the
goods and services . . . because Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an appliedfor mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential customer would
be confused, mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the
applicant and registrant.”). It took three years of advocacy before the PTO changed its mind
and allowed the registration. See Notice of Publication from Comm’r for Trademarks, to
Robert Muller-Moore, applicant (Sept. 24, 2014), http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?
caseId=sn85412053&docId=NOP20140924055805#docIndex=13&page=1
[https://
perma.cc/Q8W8-RCTL].
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of expressive works.15 While we might hope for voluntary restraint by rightsholders, the only way to ensure such restraint is to clarify boundaries and alter
incentives. Commentators have suggested a variety of tools for shifting these
incentives, and this Essay brainstorms about some more.
Part I discusses the notice failures in the normative, doctrinal, and
enforcement-related features of trademark and right-of-publicity law. In
particular, lack of clarity about the purpose and scope of these legal rights
leads to uncertainty about when the use of a trademark or a celebrity reference
requires permission. In trademark law, this uncertainty is exacerbated by
enforcement mechanisms that lack transparency and yet contribute to the
viability of bloated trademark claims. Part II explores the features of trademark
law (and, to a lesser extent, the right of publicity) that specifically reward
aggressive claiming. Especially in light of the substantive ambiguities
discussed in Part I, trademark law enables and arguably encourages trademark
holders to test the limits of their trademark rights. Part III explores the costs of
this phenomenon, and considers some possible responses.
I.

NOTICE FAILURE IN THE WHY, WHAT, AND HOW OF TRADEMARK AND
PUBLICITY RIGHTS

As Bessen and Meurer observed in Patent Failure, notice about the
existence and boundaries of legal rights is critical to any system of property.16
One need not accept trademarks or publicity rights as “property,” moreover, to
recognize notice as essential to both areas of law.17 For trademark law, markets

15

The fact that the Ninth Circuit took over two-and-a-half years to decide a case
involving a movie loosely based on a former soldier’s exploits demonstrates the breadth of
the right of publicity and the uncertainty about First Amendment protection even for
traditionally sacrosanct forms of speech. See generally Jennifer E. Rothman, Sarver Tells
Ninth Circuit—Hey, Don’t Forget About Me!, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY (Dec. 9, 2015, 2:45 PM), http://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/newscommentary/sarver-tells-ninth-circuit-%E2%80%93-hey-don%E2%80%99t-forget-aboutme [https://perma.cc/X3HC-ATRV] (“One of the reasons the Ninth Circuit delayed deciding
this case [Sarver v. Hurt Locker, LLC] was that it was waiting to see if the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in . . . the case involving right of publicity claims by former studentathletes on the basis of NCAA basketball and football videogames.”).
16
See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 7 (2009) (“Property can
fail when boundary information is not publicly accessible,” and “when the boundaries of the
rights are not clear and predictable.”).
17
Of course, “notice” plays another, even more central function in trademark law: it
explains and justifies why trademarks receive protection in the first place. See, e.g., Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (explaining that trademark law
“quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is
made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked)
in the past”). The notice concerns addressed in this article are related, but distinct: they
involve the adequacy of notice about the existence and nature of trademark rights, to
speakers and sellers who might be accused of violating those rights.

1298

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1293

could not function without some means for sellers to determine whether their
marketing plans might infringe someone else’s trademark. This requires the
ability to identify protected marks and to have some confidence about the
scope of their protection. For publicity rights, identifying the rights-holder
poses less of a problem, because disputes almost always involve deliberate
reference to, or depiction of, a known individual. But certainty about the scope
of legal entitlements is equally important in the publicity-rights context. Fuzzy
legal boundaries make it hard to assess risks associated with celebrity
references, which can chill both creative expression and new product
markets.18
If clarity of notice is the objective, both right-of-publicity and trademark law
fall well short of the mark. In part, the problem is rooted in ambivalence and
ambiguity about the laws’ normative goals. That uncertainty, in turn,
contributes to legal rights with indistinct boundaries. Finally, particularly with
trademark law, vague legal standards interact with an informal, non-transparent
enforcement regime that operates in the shadow of the law, yet (bizarrely) ends
up feeding back to shape it. On every level—from the normative to the
doctrinal to the mechanisms for enforcement—notice problems pervade these
two regimes.
A.

Why: Ambivalence and Ambiguity about Normative Goals

Admittedly, clarity about normative goals is one step removed from the sort
of notice that Bessen and Meurer were concerned with—i.e., notice to affected
parties about the existence and scope of legal rights.19 In the trademark and
right-of-publicity context, however, ambivalence about the law’s purpose has
contributed to ambiguity about the contours of legal rights, which, in turn, has
created uncertainty about whether and when permission is required for use of a
trademark or evocation of identity. Normative ambiguity, moreover, makes it
hard to predict how the law will evolve in response to new sets of facts, which
reinforces the prevailing uncertainty.20

18

Given the prevalence of risk aversion, uncertainty can also lead to unnecessary
licensing, which can impede market competition and sometimes produce rights-enhancing
feedback loops. See Stacey L. Dogan, Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum:
Publicity as a Legal Right, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED
CONTOURS OF IP 17, 36 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014) (“[T]he
prevalence of licensing . . . can lead to a market dominated by a single firm.”); cf. James
Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J.
882, 882 (2007) (“Because liability is difficult to predict and the consequences of
infringement are dire, risk-averse intellectual property users often seek a license when none
is needed.”).
19
See generally BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 16.
20
In some circumstances, flexible standards can do a better job of promoting the law’s
objectives than fixed rules. For this to happen, though, there must be agreement over the
law’s essential objective, so that decision-makers can apply the standard in a supple but
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Trademark Law

Although trademark law theoretically follows a consistent normative model,
in practice, the law has distorted and departed from that model in important
ways. The dominant theoretical model views trademarks as a means for
facilitating accurate information about products, with the ultimate goal of
making markets more competitive.21 With competition as its baseline, the law
should presume that all parties have equal access to product features and
marketing tools; trademark law should not intervene unless the defendant’s
behavior causes relevant harm to consumers, the trademark holder, or both.22
This suggests, at a minimum, that actionable confusion or misinformation must
be of the sort that could potentially affect purchasing decisions and/or the
reputation of the trademark holder.
In practice, however, trademark law can diverge from this normative vision,
in two distinct ways. First, as Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna point out,
courts sometimes lose track of the reasons for blocking confusion, and appear
to view confusion itself—of any sort—as an evil to be avoided.23 Rather than
serving as an intermediate step in facilitating competitive markets, avoidance
of confusion can take on a life of its own, justifying intervention even when it
affects neither consumer purchasing decisions nor the trademark holder’s
reputation. In the abstract, avoiding irrelevant confusion might itself sound
harmless, but as the net of actionable “confusion” expands, a growing set of
individuals has to make the tricky determination of whether their behavior
might run afoul of the law.24 When those individuals are causing no harm, it’s
relatively predictable way. When normative goals are in doubt or in internal conflict, this
becomes more challenging.
21
See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64 (“In principle, trademark law, by preventing
others from copying a source-identifying mark, ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping
and making purchasing decisions,’ for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that
this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked
items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.” (internal citation omitted)); id. at 164
(explaining that “trademark law . . . seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s
reputation”).
22
Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000)
(“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard to the
utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that
facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based on alleged inherent
distinctiveness.”).
23
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 6, at 414 (arguing that “trademark law needs to
refocus on confusion that is actually relevant to purchasing decisions”).
24
In the wake of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), some courts
have shown skepticism about granting injunctive relief in the absence of a likelihood of real
injury from infringement. See, e.g., Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Ent. Mgmt., Inc., 736
F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We now join other circuits in holding that the eBay
principle—that a plaintiff must establish irreparable harm—applies to a preliminary
injunction in a trademark infringement case.”); N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide,
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hard to justify saddling them with the costs of assessing risk and avoiding their
(harmless) behavior. Often, moreover, the individuals are engaged in behavior
that has social value of its own, making legal intervention even more costly.25
The expansion of actionable confusion has complemented a second, often
implicit, normative trend toward an unjust-enrichment approach to trademark
protection. In this view, trademark owners invest time and resources in
developing their good will, and deserve protection against those who seek to
exploit that good will without justification, even in the absence of harm.26 This
rationale relies on Lockean natural-rights reasoning—the notion that those who
invest their labor in creating something of value deserve to capture that value,
at least as long as they don’t leave others worse off.27 Several modern
Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228-29 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying irreparable harm standard in
trademark case); Williams v. Green Valley RV, Inc., No. 8:15-CV-01010-ODW-MR, 2015
WL 4694075, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2015) (applying irreparable harm standard in
trademark case). It is unclear how widely courts will adopt the Ninth Circuit’s view that
irreparable harm requires something more than a strong likelihood of confusion. See Herb
Reed, 736 F.3d at 1250 (“Gone are the days when ‘[o]nce the plaintiff in an infringement
action has established a likelihood of confusion, it is ordinarily presumed that the plaintiff
will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief does not issue.’” (quoting Rodeo Collection,
Ltd. v. W. Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir.1987))). In any event, the prospect of
damages makes the threat of an infringement suit costly, regardless of the likelihood of a
permanent injunction.
25
See generally William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 253-54 (2013) (“Some courts penalize socially valuable but
unlicensed use of marks . . . .”).
26
Several modern trademark doctrines reflect this impulse, including, among others, the
merchandising right, the federal anti-dilution statute, post-sale confusion, and initial interest
confusion. See generally Stacey L. Dogan, Harms, Benefits, and Justifications in Trademark
Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
27
In an important article, Mark McKenna contends that natural-rights reasoning
provided the primary foundations for early trademark law. See Mark P. McKenna, The
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2007)
(explaining that trademark law originally “sought to protect producers from illegitimate
diversions of their trade by competitors”). In McKenna’s view, a natural-rights approach
would limit trademark rights to situations in which direct competitors pass their products off
as originating from the trademark holder. See id. at 1899 (“Traditional trademark
protection . . . focused on producers’ attempts to steal away customers from them in close
competition proximity.”). What McKenna overlooks, however, is that the natural rights
philosophy contains no inherent, principled limit on the “fruits” of labor that the law can
legitimately protect. Thus, while nineteenth century courts limited recovery to cases
involving diverted trade, natural-rights reasoning could just as well support trademark
holders’ claim to the value of their hard-earned reputation or “goodwill.” And as advertising
and diversification led to commercial value that extended beyond trademark holders’ core
markets, trademark holders indeed pushed for broader protection. See generally Robert G.
Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U.
L. REV. 547, 548 (2006) (“Ever since the 1920s, and with greater frequency during the past
two decades, courts have relied on the idea that trademark law protects against appropriation
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trademark doctrines reflect this instinct to reward trademark holders for
developing valuable brands, and to condemn those who seek to profit from the
value of the trademark holder’s reputation.28 And courts shaping these
doctrines routinely deride parties for riding on the coattails of someone else’s
success.29 These courts seem to presume that one goal of trademark law is not
to avoid harm, but to reserve to the trademark holder the fruits of its
reputational investments. Absent some justification, in other words, parties
have no right to obtain benefit from someone else’s good name.
While scholars quarrel over whether natural-rights reasoning or the
obsession with confusion drove trademark law’s twentieth century expansion,30
it seems fair to conclude that the two trends collaborated in enabling trademark
law’s growth. More important, for current purposes, is the fact that both of
these trends contribute to trademark holders’ broad sense of entitlement to the
economic value and meanings associated with their marks.
2.

The Right of Publicity

If trademark’s compass is occasionally askew, the right of publicity is
lacking a compass altogether. Doctrinally, the modern right of publicity gives
of goodwill to justify some rather broad, and ultimately ill-advised, doctrinal expansions.”).
The only limiting principle to the Lockean approach to property lies in the famous proviso:
that laborers are entitled to the fruits of their labor as long as “enough, and as good” remains
for others. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 27, at 19 (Hacket Publ’g Co.
1980) (1690). See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1538 (1993)
(“It is because it limits the reach of the concept of property that the proviso serves as a
central source of significant free speech protections.”).
28
See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 384 (6th Cir. 2010)
(“dilution by tarnishment”); Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 603 F.3d
1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2010) (post-sale confusion); Board of Supervisors for La. State Univ.
Agric. and Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 484 (5th Cir. 2008) (sale of
merchandise bearing mark); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10
Civ. 1611-PKC, 2012 WL 1022247, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“dilution by blurring”).
29
See, e.g., V Secret, 605 F.3d at 389 (“The Moseleys do not have a right to use the word
‘secret’ in their mark. They use it only to make the association with the Victoria’s Secret
mark.”); Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1138 (“Post-purchase confusion creates a free-rider
problem.”); Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 484 (“This creation of a link in the consumer’s
mind between the t-shirts and the Universities and the intent to directly profit therefrom
results in an ‘unmistakable aura of deception’ and likelihood of confusion.” (quoting Boston
Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989))); Louis Vuitton, 2012 WL
1022247, at *13 (finding likelihood of dilution by blurring when defendant “utilized the
Louis Vuitton marks for its own branding goals” and “‘was definitely laddering and
borrowing equity from Louis Vuitton’” (citation omitted)).
30
See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 6, at 414 (arguing that trademark law
needs to refocus on confusion that is actually relevant); Mark P. McKenna, supra note 27
(arguing that natural-rights reasoning provided the primary foundations for early trademark
law).
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individuals the right to prevent commercial use of their names, likeness, or
other identifying attributes.31 From its inception, the right of publicity has
derived from an intuitive sense of fairness, rather than any measured analysis
of why, and to what extent, individuals should have the right to control uses of
their identities.32 In the opinion introducing the modern right, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the right was necessary because “many
prominent persons . . . would feel sorely deprived” in its absence.33 Subsequent
courts have sometimes grappled more directly with normative questions, but
they rarely settle on a single coherent justification. From natural rights34 to
utilitarianism35 to unjust enrichment36 to a commitment to individual dignity,37
courts have offered a grab bag of alternative reasons for giving people the right

31
See Dogan, supra note 18, at 19 (“Haelan invited celebrities to complain any time that
the use of their name, image, or other identifying attributes enhanced the appeal of a product
sold to consumers.”).
32
See id. at 23 (“The court essentially validated celebrities’ sense of entitlement to any
economic value that their celebrity status might confer to another party’s product or
service.”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn
from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2006) (“In the absence of any clear
theoretical foundation for the right of publicity, [its definition has] steadily swelled, to the
point at which virtually any reference to an individual that brings financial benefit to
someone else qualifies as a violation of the right of publicity.”); Michael Madow, Private
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125
(1993) (critiquing the normative justifications for the right of publicity).
33
Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). See generally
Dogan, supra note 18, at 23 (“The court, in other words, recognized a right in celebrities in
large part because celebrities expected the right and would feel ‘deprived’ by its absence.”).
34
See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elec. of Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“Considerable energy and ingenuity are expended by those who have achieved celebrity
value to exploit it for profit. The law protects the celebrity’s sole right to exploit this value
whether the celebrity has achieved her fame out of rare ability, dumb luck, or a combination
thereof.”).
35
See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (relying on both
natural rights and utilitarian justifications: “As such, the goal of maintaining a right of
publicity is to protect the property interest that an individual gains and enjoys in his identity
through his labor and effort. Additionally, as with protections for intellectual property, the
right of publicity is designed to encourage further development of this property interest.”).
36
See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (“The rationale
for [protecting the right of publicity] is the straightforward one of preventing unjust
enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose is served by having the defendant
get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would
normally pay.”).
37
See generally Waits v. Frito-Lay Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing
claim for damages due to mental distress resulting from imitation of singer’s voice in
advertisement). Cf. Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous SelfDefinition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225 (2005) (advocating publicity right based on interest in
“autonomous self-definition”).
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to control the use of their identities. This normative pluralism makes it difficult
both to define the right’s contours and to balance it against competing
considerations.
The result of this normative ambiguity is that people asserting right-ofpublicity claims have a cornucopia of rationales from which to draw.
Cumulatively, these rationales have led courts to describe publicity rights as a
broad entitlement to the value of personal identity.38 As a result, celebrities and
other individuals have grown accustomed to the idea that they have an
exclusive legal right to exploit their personal stories and/or their fame.39
B.

What: The Malleability and Subjectivity of Rights-Defining Doctrines

While these normative ambiguities can lead to uncertainty about why we
protect trademarks and publicity rights, the more direct form of notice failure
comes from the inability to identify rights-holders and to know how far their
rights extend. Here, too, trademark and the right of publicity law fare poorly,
albeit in somewhat different ways.
1.

Trademark Law

Trademark risks can arise in a variety of different contexts. Sometimes,
parties considering adopting a new mark or product feature must assess the risk
that a trademark holder will try to block or challenge their use or registration.40
At other times, a party knows that a mark is protected, but wants to use that
mark in some way—to refer to the trademark holder, for example, or to call
consumers’ attention to competing or complementary products.41 Finally,
because common English words can also serve as trademarks, parties

38

See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967
(10th Cir. 1996) (“Publicity rights, then, are a form of property protection that allows people
to profit from the full commercial value of their identities.”); State ex rel. Elvis Presley v.
Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (“In its broadest sense, property includes
all rights that have value . . . Today there is little dispute that a celebrity’s right of publicity
has economic value.”).
39
See, e.g., Appellant’s Consolidated Open Brief on Appeal at 20, Sarver v. Chartier,
No. 2:10-CV-09034 JHN-JC, 2016 WL 625362 (9th Cir. Feb. 17 2016), http://wwwdeadline-com.vimg.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/SARVER-BRIEF__120824163855.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4QJR-KJVG] (brief in support of U.S. soldier Sarver’s right of publicity
claim, contending that “no social purpose is served by denying Sarver compensation for his
right to his own persona” in film based on his experiences in Iraq (emphasis added) (quoting
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576)).
40
See Gibson, supra note 18, at 882 (explaining that “[trademark] liability is difficult to
predict and the consequences for infringement are dire”).
41
See, e.g., Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137
(9th Cir. 2011) (deciding trademark infringement suit against company for advertising over
search engine results for trademarked keyword of competitor).
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considering using those words—even for their common English meaning—
may face a charge of infringement.42
The subjectivity of rules governing trademark eligibility, infringement, and
privileged use can make it challenging to assess these risks with any certainty.
Suppose, for example, that a manufacturer wants to copy a visually attractive
feature of a product—say, a sleek design for a mobile phone. Even the
threshold issue of whether the design is protectable involves thorny questions
with unpredictable answers: Does the design have secondary meaning?43 Does
it perform a utilitarian function within the product, which would make it
functional and thus ineligible for trademark protection?44 If not, does it satisfy
the hopelessly indeterminate standard for aesthetic functionality?45 Messy
questions of protectability, moreover, are not limited to trade dress; the lines
between “inherently distinctive,” descriptive, and generic marks, for example,
are notoriously vague,46 and rights in unregistered marks—including, in some
jurisdictions, foreign marks with a reputation in the United States—can be hard
to appraise.47
42
See, e.g., Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 98 (2d Cir.
1989) (deciding trademark infringement suit filed by Murphy Door Bed Company against
competitor bed company for describing product as a “murphy bed”). This list does not
exhaust the different contexts in which trademark risks arise, of course, but it captures many
common scenarios.
43
Trademark law allows protection of product design that has acquired secondary
meaning, in the sense that consumers who encounter the design view it as an indication of
source. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000) (“[A]
product’s design is distinctive, and therefore protectable, only upon a showing of secondary
meaning.”).
44
See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 23 (2001)
(“Because MDI’s dual-spring design is a functional feature for which there is no trade dress
protection, MDI’s claim is barred.”).
45
See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL
2571719, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“[A]esthetic functionality is a limited doctrine that applies
‘[w]hen goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value,’ [and] ‘definitely contribute to
that value and thus aid the performance of an object for which the goods are intended’”
(emphasis added) (quoting Auto-Motive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d
1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006))).
46
See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 11.66 (4th ed.) (describing line between descriptive and suggestive marks as “hazy and
only subjectively definable”); id. § 12:20 (“The line between highly descriptive terms and
generic terms is as fuzzy and undefinable as the line between descriptive marks and
suggestive marks.”).
47
Compare, e.g., Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098
(9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing protection for well-known foreign marks when mark owner
demonstrates, “by a preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial percentage of
consumers in the relevant American market is familiar with the foreign mark”), with ITC
Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 155-65 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting well-known marks
doctrine and concluding that, under the longstanding territoriality principle, federal
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The indeterminacy, moreover, does not end with evaluating a mark’s
eligibility for protection. Trademark law’s standards for infringement and
dilution are equally murky, leaving broad discretion with fact-finders to decide
whether a contemplated mark treads too close to a protected one. Here, the
compound visions of trademark law’s purpose exacerbate the uncertainty.
Doctrines such as post-sale confusion,48 initial interest confusion,49 the
merchandising right,50 and certain versions of affiliation confusion seem
designed, at least in part, to prevent parties from evoking others’ trademarks,
without regard to confusion among customers about the source or provenance
of products. The standards for dilution by blurring, moreover, target those who
intentionally call to mind famous trademarks, apparently without regard to
whether their evocation causes harm.51

trademark protection requires use in the United States). See also ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, 9
N.Y.3d 467, 479 (2007) (“[W]hen a [foreign] business, through renown in New York,
possesses goodwill constituting property or a commercial advantage in this state, that
goodwill is protected from misappropriation under New York unfair competition law.”).
48
E.g., Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1077-78
(9th Cir. 2006) (“Shorn of their disclaimer-covered packaging, Auto Gold’s products
display no indication visible to the general public that the items are not associated with Audi
or Volkswagen. The disclaimers do nothing to dispel post-purchase confusion.”).
49
See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’n. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th
Cir. 2004) (recognizing initial interest confusion doctrine: “Although dispelled before an
actual sale occurs, initial interest confusion impermissibly capitalizes on the goodwill
associated with a mark and is therefore actionable trademark infringement.”). Compare
Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 551-52 (6th Cir. 2005)
(refusing to recognize initial interest confusion for product-design trade dress), with id. at
555 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part) (proposing initial interest confusion standard that
would turn, in part, on “whether a product shape identifies its source when viewed from the
point where the confusion is alleged to have occurred”).
50
See, e.g., Board of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 484 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Th[e] creation of a link in the consumer’s
mind between the t-shirts and the Universities and the intent to directly profit therefrom
results in an ‘unmistakable aura of deception’ and likelihood of confusion.” (citation
omitted)).
51
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012) (“[T]he owner of a famous mark that is distinctive,
inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against
another person who . . . commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely
to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of
the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic
injury.” (emphasis added)). The preamble to the blurring definition mentions harm. See id.
§ 1125(c)(2)(B) (“‘[D]ilution by blurring’ is association arising from the similarity between
a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous
mark.” (emphasis added)). But the factors themselves appear designed to gauge whether the
defendant’s use called to mind the famous mark. See id. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi) (listing
factors the court may consider when deciding a dilution or blurring claim).

1306

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1293

Finally, although courts have added some welcome clarity to trademark
defenses in recent years, the standards for nominative fair use and descriptive
fair use continue, in most jurisdictions, to turn at least part on subjective
inquiries about the risk of confusion.52 For some uses—most notably, the use
of trademarks in expressive works—the law appears to be converging on a
standard that will lead to greater predictability.53 Elsewhere, the question of
whether a defendant may refer to a trademark holder by its name can turn on
contextual questions that are hard to assess ex ante.54
I don’t mean to suggest that trademark law is hopelessly off course or
producing systematic errors. Most judges deciding trademark cases employ
measured analysis, and may well reach the right result most of the time.55 My
point is simply that, given the multiple layers of ambiguity in trademark law’s
doctrinal standards for eligibility, infringement, and protected use, a wide
variety of questionable trademark claims can pass the straight-face test.
Viewed differently, the law offers poor notice about whether and when the sale
of imitative products, or adoption of marks that resemble existing ones, might
trigger a cease-and-desist letter or complaint.
2.

Right of Publicity

In one sense, the right of publicity features less doctrinal ambiguity than
trademark law, because the identity of the rights-holder is rarely at issue, and
the right’s broad definition sweeps in virtually all profit-oriented uses of an

52

See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir.
2010) (“The nominative fair use doctrine allows such truthful use of a mark, even if the
speaker fails to expressly disavow association with the trademark holder, so long as it’s
unlikely to cause confusion as to sponsorship or endorsement.” (emphasis added)); Century
21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 231 (3d Cir. 2005) (in nominative
fair use defense, calling for consideration of “the precise way in which what the defendant
said, or did not say, other than the mere presence of the mark on the website, may have
inaccurately implied endorsement or sponsorship”); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 609 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying summary judgment
on classic fair use defense in part because of genuine issue of fact as to “the degree of
confusion”).
53
In particular, we have seen widespread adoption of the Rogers v. Grimaldi standard,
which allows the use of a trademark in an expressive work as long as it is “(1) ‘artistically
relevant’ to the work and (2) not ‘explicitly misleading’ as to the source or content of the
work.” Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 922, 931 (N.D.
Ind. 2013) (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989), and discussing
its acceptance across various circuits).
54
See generally McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 25, at 292 (noting courts’ tendency
to use limiting doctrines “that insist on lack of confusion as a condition of the limitation, or
they otherwise let their concerns about confusion infect their analysis”).
55
Cf. id. at 294 (“A doctrine that often reaches correct results, but only by imposing high
litigation costs, offers cold comfort to most would-be competitors or commentators.”).
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individual’s name, likeness, or identity.56 Most states, moreover, have specific
carve-outs for news reporting and other informational uses.57 For many
affected parties, then, the rules are fairly clear: use of celebrity name or
likeness in advertisements and merchandise is almost always a violation,58 and
use in news reporting and other explicit commentary is almost always
exempt.59
In between these two extremes, however, lies a murky middle ground of
behavior whose risk is much harder to gauge. Courts have especially struggled
with products that incorporate celebrity names or images into expressive visual
works, such as prints,60 t-shirts,61 comic strips,62 and video games.63 Because

56
See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating
that California common-law right of publicity “may be pleaded by alleging (1) the
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or
likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4)
resulting injury” (quoting Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417 (1983))).
57
E.g., Fla. Stat. § 540.08(4)(a) (2015) (providing a carve-out for “the publication,
printing, display or use of the name of any person in any . . . news medium or publication”).
58
See Dogan, supra note 18, at 29 ( “[P]roducts viewed as pure ‘celebrity
merchandise’—posters, trinkets, and other standalone products featuring the celebrity’s
unaltered likeness . . . are consistently found to violate the right of publicity.”). Compare the
situation in Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, where use in advertisements can constitute
passing off, but celebrity merchandise does not require permission. See generally Stacey L.
Dogan, The Right of Publicity: A Cautionary Tale from the United States, in THE INTERNET
AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NEW FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Susy Frankel
& Daniel Gervais, eds., forthcoming 2016).
59
Dogan, supra note 18, at 28 (“At one end of the spectrum lie traditional expressive
products such as newspapers, books, and movies that offer information, criticism, or
commentary about the celebrity. These overtly expressive products reliably defeat right-ofpublicity claims.”).
60
E.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 2003) (deciding a
suit by Tiger Woods against seller of limited edition prints entitled “The Masters of
Augusta” and featuring Woods and other former tournament winners).
61
See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 800 (Cal. 2001)
(ruling on a claim against seller of t-shirts featuring charcoal drawing of Three Stooges).
62
See, e.g., Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 746 (Cal. 2003) (considering claims by
musicians against publisher of comic book that depicted two “villainous half-worm, halfhuman offspring” whose name and features resembled them); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110
S.W.3d 363, 365 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (allowing claims by hockey player known as Tony
Twist against publisher of comic book featuring “a villainous character sharing his name”).
See generally Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask That Eats into the Face: Images and the Right of
Publicity, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 157 (2015).
63
See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. (Keller),
724 F.3d 1268, 1279 n.10 (9th Cir. 2013) (attempting to distinguish between works with a
“primary emphasis on reproducing reality” and “other kinds of expressive works” that might
enjoy first amendment protection); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2013)
(Ambro, J., dissenting) (“I agree with my colleagues that the Transformative Use Test is the
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these products derive value from their use of a person’s identity, they meet the
elements for a presumptive right-of-publicity violation in most states.64 At the
same time, they contain additional expression that qualifies them for some
level of protection under the First Amendment.65 As a result, courts have had
to balance the state right-of-publicity interest against constitutional speech
interests in these cases.66 It’s here that notice problems have arisen, because of
the nebulous tools that courts have crafted for balancing speech and celebrity
concerns. A variety of legal standards have emerged, but in the end, outcomes
seem to turn largely on judges’ intuitive, case-by-case feelings about the line
between expression and exploitation.67
Take the “transformative test,” which the California Supreme Court adopted
in Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,68 a case involving t-shirts
depicting the Three Stooges.69 In the words of the court:
In sum, when an artist is faced with a right of publicity challenge to his or
her work, he or she may raise as affirmative defense that the work is
protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it contains significant
transformative elements or that the value of the work does not derive

preferred approach for balancing these [right of publicity and speech] interests, but we part
ways on its interpretation and application. The result is that they side with Hart, and I with
EA.”); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(allowing claims by band No Doubt against makers of “videogame featuring computergenerated images of the members of No Doubt”); Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr.
3d 607, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting a celebrity suit against distributers of video
game that presented a distorted version of her persona). See generally Tushnet, supra note
62.
64
See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir.
1996) (explaining that any “(1) knowing use of . . . name or likeness (2) on products,
merchandise, or goods (3) without . . . prior consent” violates right of publicity in the
absence of a “valid defense”); White v. Samsung Elec. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397-99 (9th
Cir. 1992) (discussing White’s common law right of publicity claim).
65
See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 924 (“Cases involving Lanham Act false endorsement
claims and state law claims of the right of publicity have considered the impact of the First
Amendment on those types of claims.”).
66
See id. (discussing “how First Amendment rights have been balanced against
intellectual property rights in cases involving the Lanham Act and the state law rights of
publicity”).
67
See, e.g., Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279 n.10 (defining test as “whether a likely purchaser’s
primary motivation is to buy a reproduction of the celebrity, or to buy the expressive work
of that artist”); Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001)
(explaining that the key question is “whether the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw
materials’ from which an original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation
of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in question”).
68
21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
69
Id. at 800.
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primarily from the celebrity’s fame.70
This sounds simple enough, offering refuge to right-of-publicity defendants
who can prove either that their work contained significant transformative
elements, or that it does not owe its value primarily to the celebrity’s fame. In
practice, however, the standard raises more questions than it answers. What
kind of “transformative elements” can count in defendants’ favor? Must the
defendant somehow transform the name or image itself, or is it sufficient to
incorporate them into a broader expressive work?71 How do we decide whether
a work’s value derives principally from the defendant’s contributions, or
instead from the celebrity’s fame? The long opinion repeatedly invokes its
“transformative” test without answering these questions. Indeed, the court’s
multiple iterations of its standard offer something for everyone.72 In the end,
the opinion leaves no clear roadmap, instead leaving it to judges to apply their
subjective intuition about whether the defendant is engaged in protected speech
or commercial exploitation.
Admittedly, the Saderup transformative test offers clarity for creators of
certain types of expressive works. Parodists and critics, for example, know that
they cannot face right-of-publicity claims from the target of their reproach.73
Other visual manipulations or critical uses, including distortions and “heavyhanded lampooning,” are equally protected.74 Yet beyond cases of direct and
obvious criticism, commentary, or visual manipulation, the court’s standard
offers less guidance, and seems to collapse into a subjective inquiry into

70

Id. at 810.
At least implicitly, the court suggests the latter, because it offers factual account
reporting as an example of a class of works that enjoy First Amendment protection. Id. at
809. But the opinion never explicitly defines the kind of expressive contributions that can
make a work transformative under its standard.
72
See, e.g., id. at 808 (identifying the relevant question as whether a work “contains
significant transformative elements”); id. at 808 & n.10 (framing the inquiry as whether “a
work is worthy of First Amendment protection because added creative elements
significantly transform the celebrity depiction” (emphasis added)); id. at 809 (including
“factual reporting, . . . fictionalized portrayal . . . , heavy-handed lampooning . . . [and]
subtle social criticism” as among types of uses protected by the First Amendment); id.
(“Another way of stating the inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw
materials’ from which an original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation
of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in question.”); id. (“We ask, in
other words, whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has
become primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness. And
when we use the word ‘expression,’ we mean expression of something other than the
likeness of the celebrity.”).
73
Id. at 808 (“[W]orks of parody or other distortions of the celebrity figure are not, from
the celebrity fan’s viewpoint, good substitutes for conventional depictions of the celebrity
and therefore do not generally threaten markets for celebrity memorabilia that the right of
publicity is designed to protect.”).
74
Id. at 809.
71
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whether the work was unduly exploitative of the celebrity’s fame.75 Indeed, it’s
not clear how some classic sorts of protected use would be analyzed under a
transformative standard. Take “factual reports”—a category of expression that
the court assumes would qualify for First Amendment protection under its
standard, and that has always been presumed to lie beyond the reach of the
publicity right.76 Yet the court never elaborates on why factual accounts so
clearly meet its transformative standard—and one could argue that many of
them would fail. Suppose, for example, that the “factual report” comes in a
gossip article in a tabloid magazine, accompanied by an attention-grabbing
front-page photo of the celebrity. With respect to the photo, at least, couldn’t
the celebrity argue that the celebrity likeness is the “sum and substance” of the
work, and that the cover derives most of its value from the celebrity’s fame?
The Saderup court clearly did not intend to reach tabloids or other
“news”-oriented uses of celebrity identities. Yet the example illustrates the
indeterminacy of the transformative test. In the absence of objective tools for
distinguishing between protected and unprotected uses, the transformative test
relies on subjective, historically contingent instincts about the line between
speech and exploitation. The problem with such a subjective inquiry, of course,
is that exploitation lies in the eye of the beholder. The test has proven
especially problematic for parties that incorporate visual depictions of
celebrities into expressive products outside the traditional realm of books and
news reports. In these cases, courts have increasingly gravitated toward the
view that, absent some parody or visual distortion, products bearing celebrity
likenesses violate the right of publicity.77 So far, this trend has mainly limited
itself to video games and comic books. Based on the success of these suits,
however, plaintiffs have begun to test the waters with more traditional media,
including historical and biographical books,78 sports broadcasts,79 and

75
Indeed, with respect to one of its examples of works that likely satisfy the
“transformative” test, the opinion reflects some internal uncertainty. At one point in the
opinion, the court mentions Andy Warhol paintings as “subtle social criticism” that would
likely pass muster. Id. Later, the court returns to the paintings and indicates that, in light of
their subtle social commentary, the paintings “may well be entitled to First Amendment
protection.” Id. at 811 (emphasis added).
76
Id. at 809 (“We emphasize that the transformative elements or creative contributions
that require First Amendment protection are not confined to parody and can take many
forms, [including] factual reporting.”).
77
See generally Tushnet, supra note 62.
78
E.g., Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp., No. 15-10880, 2016
WL 25495, at *5 (11th Cir. Jan. 4, 2016) (affirming summary judgment against the Parks
Institute in its lawsuit claiming “unlawful commercial exploitation of a celebrity” based on
use of Rosa Parks’s name and likeness in biographical books and movie).
79
See, e.g., Marshall v. ESPN, 111 F. Supp. 3d 815, 383 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) (dismissing
right-of-publicity claims by college athletes against ESPN, based on use of their images in
sports broadcasts).
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fictional80 and non-fictional films.81 These suits have largely failed, but the fact
that they were filed at all suggests an increasing uncertainty about the outer
limits of right-of-publicity claims.
California’s “transformative” test is not the only one used to balance rightof-publicity interests against the First Amendment. Other jurisdictions have
applied a variety of other tests that differ from one another both substantively
and on the extent to which they offer notice of the limits of right-of-publicity
claims. The “predominate use” test—like some of the language in Saderup82—
asks whether the value of the work derives predominantly from the artist’s
contributions or from the draw of the celebrity’s fame.83 The direct First
Amendment balancing test purports to ask—directly—whether the speech
interests of the defendant outweigh the celebrity’s interest in exploiting her
fame.84 While they may give different weight to speech and celebrity interests,
both of these tests ultimately come down to the same subjective inquiry as the
transformative standard—does the defendant’s behavior have enough social
value to override the celebrity’s interest in controlling the value of her fame?
The one test that provides greater structure and certainty—the deferential
standard of Rogers v. Grimaldi85—has been largely rejected in the right-ofpublicity context.86 Thus, in the one area in which trademark law has moved

80

E.g., Sarver v. Hurt Locker LLC, No. 2:10-cv-09034-JHN-JC, 2011 WL 11574477, at
*1-2 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (rejecting claims by former soldier based on the unauthorized use of
his experiences and personal characteristic in fictionalized movie).
81
So far, courts have been unsympathetic to right-of-publicity claims by athletes
depicted in sports broadcasts and related compilations. See, e.g., Marshall, 11 F. Supp. 3d at
830 (dismissing student-athletes’ right of publicity claim against sports broadcaster, on the
ground that sports broadcasts are exempt from Tennessee’s right of publicity); Gionfriddo v.
Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“Balancing
plaintiffs’ negligible economic interests against the public’s enduring fascination with
baseball’s past, we conclude that the public interest favoring the free dissemination of
information regarding baseball’s history far outweighs any proprietary interests at stake.”).
82
See, e.g., Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001) (“The
inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than qualitative, asking whether the literal and
imitative or the creative elements predominate in the work.”).
83
E.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (“[T]he use
and identity of Twist’s name has become predominantly a ploy to sell comic books and
related products rather than an artistic or literary expression, and under these circumstances,
free speech must give way to the right of publicity.”).
84
E.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th
Cir. 1996) (“The law attempts to . . . [strike] a proper balance between the right of a creator
to the fruits of his labor and the right of future creators to free expression.”).
85
875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); see supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the
Rogers standard).
86
See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]herein lies the
weakness of comparing the right of publicity to trademark protections: the right of publicity
is broader and, by extension, protects a greater swath of property interests. Thus, it would be
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from vagueness to relative clarity, the right of publicity has muddled on in
ambiguity.
This diverse doctrinal menu, when combined with the subjectivity of the
standards as applied, reinforces the impression that most cases turn less on
doctrine than on judges’ personal views about the line between legitimate use
and exploitation.87 Some courts show skepticism about publicity rights and
weigh them lightly against speech interests,88 while others view the use of
name or likeness to enhance the value of a product as inherently suspect.89 As a
result, beyond the conventional worlds of advertising (at one end) and news
accounts (at the other), the law offers inadequate notice of when the use of a
celebrity name or likeness supports a right-of-publicity claim.
C.

How: Notice Failure In Enforcement Practice

So far, this Part has demonstrated that both trademark and right-of-publicity
law offer inadequate notice about the existence and scope of legal entitlements.
As a result, parties considering adopting trademarks, or incorporating
individuals’ identities into their expressive works, often cannot predict, with
confidence, whether they will run afoul of someone else’s legal rights.
Particularly in trademark law, this substantive notice failure is compounded
by a lack of transparency in the mechanisms for enforcing trademark rights.
While statistics are hard to come by, commentators agree that the vast majority

unwise for us to adopt a test [from Rogers] that hews so closely to traditional trademark
principles.” (citing Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004)).
87
Compare, for example, the sports video game cases with Noriega. Compare, e.g.,
Hart, 717 F.3d at 154 (“Appellant’s claims stemmed from Appellee’s alleged use of his
likeness and biographical information in its NCAA Football series of videogames.”), with
Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC-551747, 2014 WL 5930149 at *1 (Cal. Super.
2014) (“The complaint . . . contends that defendants: (1) designed, created, advertised and
sold the popular video game ‘Call of Duty: Black Ops II;’ . . . [and] ‘engaged in the blatant
misuse, unlawful exploitation and misappropriation of plaintiff’s image and likeness for
economic gain.’”). Both cases involved very similar likenesses of the depicted parties, but
the college football players tended to win, while Noriega lost, based on the same
“transformative” test. Compare, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 168 (“[W]e consider whether the
type and extent of [video game player] interactivity permitted is sufficient to transform the
Appellant’s likeness into the Appellee’s own expression. We hold that it does not.”
(emphasis added)), with Noriega, 2014 WL 5930149, at *4 (“[E]vidence compels the
conclusion that defendants’ use of Noriega’s likeness was transformative. . . . [T]he
marketability and economic value of the challenged work in this case comes not from
Noriega, but from the creativity, skill and reputation of defendants.”).
88
E.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972 (“Cardtoons’ interest in publishing its parody trading
cards implicates some of the core concerns of the First Amendment.”).
89
E.g., White v. Samsung Elec. of Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“Considerable energy and ingenuity are expended by those who have achieved celebrity
value to exploit it for profit. The law protects the celebrity’s sole right to exploit this
value . . . .”).
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of trademark enforcement happens through cease-and-desist letters sent to
parties that have used marks or applied to register them.90 By all accounts,
many recipients of these letters back down without regard to the merits of the
claim against them. William Gallagher, Irina Manta, Leah Chan Grinvald,
Kenneth Port, and others have explored the structural reasons for this
widespread capitulation, which often boil down to an unwillingness to endure
the expense and uncertainty of prolonged litigation brought by deep-pocketed
plaintiffs.91 The notice failures identified above play a critical role in
recipients’ unwillingness to fight: given the vagaries of trademark rules, many
businesses would rather change their marketing plans ex ante than engage in
protracted battle with uncertain outcomes.92
This shadowy, pervasive cease-and-desist practice is not only enabled by
trademark law’s notice failures, but it also exacerbates them, by creating an
impression of broader rights than the law provides. Cease-and-desist letters
routinely include lists of other parties that have surrendered to the trademark
holder’s demands to abandon their marks.93 Such lists can leave the impression
that the trademark holder had the legal right to force each of these surrenders,
even though most of them resulted, not from any judicial decision, but from a
blend of legal ambiguity and risk aversion.94 Part II, below, discusses the ways
in which successful cease-and-desist practice can actually expand the
90
William Gallagher’s qualitative empirical study, based on interviews with intellectual
property lawyers, supports the notion that most trademark disputes are resolved through
cease-and-desist letters followed by private negotiation. See William T. Gallagher,
Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law, 28 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453, 453 (2012) (“‘Cease and desist’ letters, phone calls, and
negotiations with alleged infringers constitute the bulk of IP enforcement efforts in
trademark and copyright practice.”); see also Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-andDesist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 411, 411 (2015) (“Statistics show that approximately only
three percent of all legal disputes are brought to the judicial system.” (citation omitted)).
91
See generally supra notes 2, 90; see also Gibson, supra note 18.
92
This is especially true for parties that have filed an intent-to-use application to register
a mark that they have not yet adopted. The cost of selecting and adopting a different
trademark may pale in comparison to the cost of re-branding in the event of an injunction or
ultimate PTO rejection. And while PTO proceedings move more quickly than federal court
litigation, final resolution can take years—too long to put branding and marketing plans on
hold. Cf. Classic Liquor Imps., Ltd. v. Spirits Int’l B.V., No. 15 Civ. 6503 JSR, 2015 WL
9487886, at *5, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2015) (referencing efforts by established firm to
disrupt upstart competitor’s adoption of trademark, and allowing declaratory judgment
action to resolve parties’ relative rights).
93
E.g., Letter from Auma N. Reggy, Attorney for Chick-fil-A, to Daniel P. Richardson,
Attorney for Bo Muller-Moore 3 (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.scribd.com/doc/
74942618/Chick-fil-A-2011-C-D-Letter-Over-Eat-More-Kale#download [https://perma.cc/
7HG9-6K9V] (listing thirty marks “in which the owners/users . . . agreed to cease and desist
their use,” including EAT MORE VEGETABLES and EAT MORE BEER).
94
See generally Gibson, supra note 18, at 901 (“Even when the argument for liability is
weak, the letter’s recipient knows that he or she can no longer hope to proceed unnoticed.”).
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substantive scope of trademark rights. Even apart from that effect, however,
the track record of success can appear, to recipients, like a common-law record
of outcomes in conflicts involving the mark. When this happens, the ceaseand-desist letter has a multiplier effect: not only has it convinced the current
target to back down from its use, but it also fortifies the mark-holder’s
credibility with future targets. The non-transparency of trademark law’s ceaseand-desist tradition, in other words, can magnify the effects of uncertainty and
risk aversion, making it even more difficult for users of trademarks to assess
the legitimacy and legality of their use.
II.

EXACERBATING DOCTRINES AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES

Given the combination of substantive and procedural features discussed
above, trademark and right of publicity law arguably give insufficient guidance
about when the use of a trademark, or depiction of a person, requires
permission (or should simply be avoided). Rights-holders have a broad zone of
plausibility for their trademark and right-of-publicity claims; especially in
trademark law, the ratcheting effect of cease-and-desist practice can create the
illusion of even more elastic limits.
This Part contends that a combination of rhetoric, economics and legal rules
creates incentives for right-holders to test the outer limits of their legal rights—
and indeed, that aggression can pay by expanding the legal entitlement. In the
right-of-publicity context, the explanation is straightforward: individuals have
a direct economic interest—sometimes complemented by dignity or moral
concerns—in exploiting their identity to the greatest extent possible, and rightof-publicity rhetoric gives them a sense of entitlement to the value of their
fame. Trademark law shares these economic incentives, but adds two twists: a
misunderstanding of policing obligations among trademark holders, combined
with rules that effectively enlarge the legal interests of parties that stake broad
claims. Given that, it is unsurprising that trademark holders assert claims
against a wide range of uses, even in the absence of harm.
A.

Right-of-Publicity Incentives

As discussed above, the rhetoric of right-of-publicity law starts with a
presumption that celebrities own the economic value associated with their
fame. While speech interests can sometimes overcome that presumption, courts
evaluate them on a case-by-case basis, under subjective and indeterminate
standards that make outcomes hard to predict. The same uncertainties that
make it hard for creators to gauge the risks associated with expressive works
offer at least a prospect of success for depicted parties to block or profit from
the challenged use of their identity. For a variety of reasons, this prospect may
be sufficient to trigger claims that test the limits of legal doctrine, even when
the stakes of a particular lawsuit appear small.
First, for some “franchise” plaintiffs whose identity has broad appeal to
consumers across a range of different products, a successful right-of-publicity
action may solidify licensing markets that extend well beyond that case. Take
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the recent lawsuit by the Rosa & Raymond Parks Institute against Target,
based on the sale of books, movies, and plaques bearing Rosa Parks’s name
and likeness.95 Parks’s foundation claimed that Target’s sale of these
products—and its use of her name and image in advertising those products—
violated her right of publicity.96 Both the trial court and the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the claims, invoking a “qualified privilege to report on matters in the
public interest . . . deeply rooted in Michigan jurisprudence.”97 Had the claims
succeeded, however, the Parks foundation would have been entitled to
licensing fees from a vast array of civil-rights-related expressive works and
merchandise sold by Target and other vendors. Even with a low likelihood of
success, then, the expected gains from the lawsuit may have exceeded the costs
of bringing it, which could explain this otherwise perplexing litigation.
The interest in protecting broad licensing markets also undoubtedly explains
Comedy III v. Saderup, a lawsuit against an artist who sold silkscreen t-shirts
with images of the Three Stooges.98 C3 Entertainment, Inc., the assignee of the
Three Stooges’ publicity rights, has a robust licensing program “with many
diverse licensees offering thousands of different products and services all over
the world . . . .”99 The California Supreme Court’s decision in Saderup—that a
t-shirt made from a charcoal drawing of the Three Stooges violated their right
of publicity100—gave C3 a sturdy foundation for its active (and, presumably,
profitable) licensing campaign.
A second factor that may explain some recent right-of-publicity gambles is
their suitability for class-action status. Many mass-produced expressive works,
especially in the sports context, involve numerous, similarly situated parties
whose claims can be resolved as a class.101 While each class member may have
an insignificant expected recovery,102 the aggregate damages from a successful
95

Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp., No. 15-10880, 2016 WL
25495, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 4, 2016).
96
Id. at *2. The lawsuit also included claims of unfair competition and unjust
enrichment. Id.
97
Id. at *4 (quoting Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 398 N.W.2d 245, 253
(Mich. 1986)); Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp., 90 F. Supp. 3d
1256, 1264-65 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (“Michigan courts . . . have applied the legitimate public
interest privilege to instances where the misappropriation occurred for the purposes of
making a profit.”), aff’d, No. 15-10880, 2016 WL 25495 (11th Cir. Jan. 4, 2016).
98
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
99
Licensing, C3 ENTERTAINMENT, INC., http://www.threestooges.com/licensing/
[https://perma.cc/QNF9-XXZ3].
100
Saderup, 21 P.3d at 811.
101
E.g., Marshall v. Nat’l. Football League, 787 F.3d 502, 505-06 (8th Cir. 2015)
(deciding suit filed by a class of former NFL players alleging that the League violated their
publicity rights by selling films with game footage).
102
Individual student-athletes have earned fairly small recoveries in their right-ofpublicity suit against video game manufacturers. See Jon Solomon, Current NCAA Players
Could Benefit from Video Game Settlement, CBS SPORTS (May 31, 2014),
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action would be substantial, making them attractive candidates for class-action
plaintiffs’ lawyers.
Finally, factors other than economics clearly play a role in some right-ofpublicity suits. For college athletes who feel exploited by video games that
bring revenues to the NCAA but not to them, lawsuits offer the opportunity to
vindicate their frustration with the NCAA’s amateurism rules.103 And for
plaintiffs like Jeffrey Sarver, a lawsuit offers the opportunity to object to a
fictionalized account that allegedly portrayed him (or, more accurately, a
character based on him) as a “mad, foolish, crazy, wild, mentally ill man, who
will recklessly risk his and others’ lives because of an addiction / fascination
with death.”104
B.

Trademark Doctrine and the Benefits of Sharp Elbows

The vagueness of trademark law’s boundaries helps to explain why even
questionable trademark claims have a veneer of plausibility, giving accused
parties little certainty about legal risks associated with their use of a mark.
Trademark holders, of course, have plenty of financial incentive to assert many
of these claims, particularly through cheap and easy cease-and-desist letters.
Sometimes, the claims are an attempt to avoid competition, or to maximize
licensing revenues associated with their marks. The National Football League,
for example, is notorious for objecting to any mention of the Super Bowl in
non-officially-licensed advertising.105 Although the nominative fair use
doctrine would protect many Super Bowl references in ads, the League has
succeeded in intimidating advertisers into compliance, presumably in the hope
of enhancing the value to “official sponsors” of the right to mention the Big
Game.106 Similar economic motivations explain efforts by universities and
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24577543/current-ncaaplayers-could-benefit-from-video-game-settlement
[https://perma.cc/R58J-YJB8]
(mentioning recoveries ranging from $48 for players featured on game roster to $15,000 for
named plaintiffs).
103
See, e.g., Keller, 724 F.3d 1268, 1289 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that “even if an
athlete wished to license his image to EA, the athlete could not do so without destroying
amateur status”).
104
Plaintiff’s Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 15, Sarver v. Hurt Locker, LLC,
No. 2:10-cv-09034-JHN-JC, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2010).
105
See Steve Baird, The NFL’s Super Bowl Trademark Nonsense, DUETSBLOG (Jan. 27,
2015),
http://www.duetsblog.com/2015/01/articles/trademarks/the-nfls-super-bowltrademark-nonsense/ [https://perma.cc/HWK4-QCAQ] (“Advertisers—fearful of NFL legal
action—strain and contort to avoid the two words that could make out a nominative fair use
of the Super Bowl trademark, opting instead for pairs of other code words like ‘Super
Sunday,’ the ‘Big Game,’ ‘Super Party,’ or ‘Superb Owl’ coverage.”).
106
Indeed, the NFL tried to register The Big Game to prevent even this reference to its
winter sporting event. See Peter Lattman, The NFL Punts on Trademarking “The Big
Game”, WALL STREET J.: L. BLOG (May 25, 2007, 9:17 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
2007/05/25/the-nfl-punts-on-trademarking-the-big-game/ [https://perma.cc/U963-SVW8]. It
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other entities to clamp down on sale of merchandise bearing any relationship to
their logos or colors.107 Encouraged by the normative trend toward an unjust
enrichment approach to trademark law, brand owners have vigorously pursued
licensing markets to optimize the profits they can earn from their marks.108 As
a result, they often object to any perceived threat to those markets, even by
parties engaged in expressive or nominative use.
In other contexts, mark owners appear motivated by a desire to squelch
commentary or to control the mental associations that consumers have
regarding their marks. The National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (“NAACP”), for example, threatened an anti-abortion group
that used its trademark in an online article criticizing its position on
abortion.109 The state of Louisiana sued MoveOn.org for creating billboards
that used the state’s tourism logo to parody Governor Jindal’s position on
abortion.110 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce sued a comedy duo for staging a
fake press conference announcing a change in the Chamber’s position on
climate change.111
If courts are concerned about trademark holders abusing their rights in an
effort to prevent nominative or expressive uses, they should firm up these
limiting doctrines to eliminate the plausibility of some of these questionable
claims. The law has arguably improved with regard to expressive uses; courts
could further improve matters by not letting confusion in through the back
door with respect to nominative fair use. Only after achieving greater doctrinal
failed, of course, because that term has long been used in connection with an annual football
game between University of California, Berkeley, and Stanford. Id. The International
Olympic Committee has taken similar actions with respect to use of the OLYMPIC name or
logo, going so far as to persuade host countries to pass legislation prohibiting even nonconfusing uses of Olympic-related names and symbols. See Susan Corbett & Alexandra
Sims, Sui Generis Protection for Sporting Emblems and Words: A Triumph of Pragmatism
Over Principle, in THE INTERNET AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NEW FORMS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais eds., forthcoming 2016); Jeré
Longman, Where Even Sausage Rings Are Put on the Chopping Block, N.Y. TIMES (July 24,
2012), http://nyti.ms/1Tuh9Op [https://perma.cc/VX39-Z3D2] (discussing how a butcher
was told to remove the Olympic rings he had placed on a sign outside of his shop).
107
See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel
Co., 550 F.3d 465, 485 (5th Cir. 2008) (granting summary judgment in favor of university
on its claims that defendant infringed by selling t-shirts featuring school colors and other
trademarks).
108
See Pete Canalichio, Brand Licensing Provides More Outlets for Profit and Exposure,
ENTREPRENEUR
(May
23,
2014),
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/234163
[https://perma.cc/8MPC-9KB7] (discussing the benefits of licensing a brand).
109
Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2015).
110
Dardenne v. MoveOn.org, No. 14-00150-SDD-SCR, 2014 WL 1364854, at *4 (M.D.
La. Apr. 7, 2014).
111
See Bill Donahue, Six Ways IP Has Been Used to Attack Critics, LAW360 (June 3,
2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/663167/print?section=media [https://perma.cc/
3QPJ-MZAL].

1318

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1293

clarity can courts take the next step of imposing sanctions or other costs
against parties that assert abusive or overreaching claims.112
Clarifying these doctrines can address many examples of trademark-holder
overreaching—cases in which the defendant has some legitimate interest in
referencing the trademark holder either directly or through evocation. A whole
other species of purported bullying, however, involves improbable claims of
infringement against parties whose marks happen to resemble a protected one.
Take Monster Mini Golf, for example, facing a charge of infringement by
Monster Cable.113 Or the claim that EAT MORE KALE t-shirts infringe rights
on a fast food chain’s EAT MOR CHIKIN mark.114 Here, too, ambiguities in
trademark doctrine make the claims difficult to disregard, but it’s hard to
imagine that the trademark holder is harmed—or even that it loses a licensing
opportunity—as a result of the use. It might appear, then, that trademark
holders act irrationally when they object to such uses. But the doctrine actually
encourages them to do so, in two distinct ways.
The first way in which the doctrine encourages aggressive behavior is
through the oft-repeated trope that trademark holders must police their marks.
In reality, trademark holders’ obligation to police is more limited than some
trademark holders appear to believe; they cannot lose their rights, for example,
by failing to object to uses that do not rise to the level of infringement.115 But
the law does require trademark holders to take certain enforcement steps in
order to preserve their rights, and the very ambiguities that create notice
problems for putative defendants may well encourage trademark holders to
take an “object first, analyze later” approach to enforcement. And in some
circumstances, at least—particularly the context of genericide—the doctrine

112
See, e.g., Manta, supra note 2, at 863 (“An excessively blurry line between forceful
but legitimate enforcement and bullying is bound to render judicial sanctions ineffective.”).
See generally Grinvald, supra note 90.
113
Steve Stecklow, The Scariest Monster of All Sues for Trademark Infringement, WALL
STREET J. (Apr. 4, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123869022704882969
[https://perma.cc/8A5E-4GD3] (exploring the claims against Monster Mini Golf and
explaining that “[o]ver the years, [Monster Cable] has gone after purveyors of monsterbranded auto transmissions, slot machines, glue, carpet-cleaning machines and an energy
drink, as well as a woman who sells ‘Junk Food Monster’ kids’ T-shirts that promote good
eating habits”).
114
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
115
E.g., ProFitness Physical Therapy Ctr. v. Pro-Fit Orthopedic & Sports Physical
Therapy P.C., 314 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff should not be obligated to sue
until its right to protection has ripened such that plaintiff knew or should have known . . .
that [plaintiff] had a provable infringement claim . . . .”). See generally Sheff, supra note 2,
at 883 (“But the duty to police is not absolute—not every forbearance from enforcement
will negatively affect a mark owner’s legal rights—and clients should know about that as
well.”); Adidas Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1259 (D. Or.
2007) (rejecting argument that failure to object to third-party use of related but distinct
marks could constitute abandonment of asserted trademark).
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does effectively require trademark holders to pay attention to third-party use of
their mark, lest they lose rights in the mark.116 Sandy Rierson and Deven Desai
have suggested adjustments that would reduce the burden on trademark holders
to police non-branding use of terms that have both trademark and generic
significance.117 More generally, trademark law would benefit from greater
clarity about the duty to police.
Misconceptions of the duty to police, however, may play a smaller role in
encouraging trademark aggression than another, far more intractable, feature of
trademark law: the notion that “stronger” trademarks get more robust legal
rights than “weaker” ones. Several rules of trademark law offer broader legal
protection to parties that have succeeded in creating space between their marks
and others—even when those others sell products that bear no relation to the
trademark holder’s. These doctrines arguably encourage trademark holders to
object to others’ trademarks, without regard to whether those parties are
threatening confusion or causing other harm. Indeed, one could argue that, in
light of these doctrines, many cases of purported bullying involve trademark
holders making rational attempts to maximize the value of their assets—not
because they risk losing their marks if they fail to object, but because their
rights will be more valuable if their objection succeeds.118
The most obvious of these doctrines is anti-dilution law, which gives owners
of “famous” marks the right to prevent the “dilution” of their marks through
tarnishment or blurring.119 Critics have questioned the basis for these laws,
contending, among other things, that the strongest marks may be the least
likely to suffer loss of distinctiveness from other parties’ use of similar

116

See Grinvald, supra note 2, at 640 (“Since the expanded scope of trademark
protection is afforded to stronger trademarks, trademark owners have a burden of either
increasing the strength of their trademark, or ensuring that their strong trademark does not
lose its strength.”); cf. Kiser, supra note 2, at 229-32 (discussing how the actual risk of
losing a trademark due to failure to police is “highly exaggerated”). Sandra Rierson and
Deven Desai have taken issue with this aspect of genericism doctrine, and have advocated a
more nuanced approach that would preserve trademark protection for marks that have
trademark significance, even if they also have a generic meaning. See generally Deven R.
Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
1789 (2007).
117
Desai & Rierson, supra note 116, at 1792 (“[W]e contend that the genericism doctrine
should be re-anchored to focus on the mark’s ability to act as a source identifier for the
consumer in commercial contexts.”).
118
See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 46, § 11.91 (“[T]he corporate owners of
trademarks have a duty to protect and preserve the corporation’s trademark assets though
vigilant policing and appropriate acts of enforcement. Inaction will inevitably lead to
erosion of those key corporate assets: the marks that identify and distinguish the
corporation’s goods and services.”).
119
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012).

1320

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1293

signs.120 Yet the law provides this powerful form of protection to famous
marks based on the assumption that use of similar marks by unauthorized
parties may whittle away the famous mark’s distinctiveness. And in deciding
whether such whittling away is likely to occur, courts are instructed to
consider, among other things, “the extent to which the owner of the famous
mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark.”121 Mark owners
aspiring to attain “famous mark” status thus have an incentive to object to
third-party use of their mark, even on different products and when confusion is
unlikely.
The bias in favor of “strong” marks extends beyond dilution laws. In
infringement analysis, strong marks get a thumb on the scale in proving
likelihood of confusion.122 Strength, moreover, turns in part on distance
between the claimed mark and others in the marketplace.123 In gauging that
distance, courts don’t always limit themselves to marks that are close
enough—in nature and in connection with their goods—to justify a claim of
infringement. Some courts also take into account whether marks sharing
120

See, e.g., Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law,
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1149-50 (2006) (“While two identical
marks coexisting in the same marketplace will by definition negate each other’s uniqueness,
they need not blur each other, i.e., they need not increase consumer search costs or
otherwise require consumers to ‘think for a moment’ before recognizing the respective
sources of the marks. This is especially the case when one of the marks is very strong.”);
Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86
TEX. L. REV. 507, 542-44 (2008) (“Instead of a tree of associations, a better metaphor for
mental models of strong brands might be a city with numerous one-way streets.”); cf.
Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for an Elusive
Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 265, 272 (2000) (“[S]ome brands, such as
Continental Airlines, are so familiar to consumers . . . that recall of their original product
category is largely immune to trademark dilution.”); Tushnet, supra, at 541 n.170
(discussing the continued strength of the Hyatt and Lexis brands despite exposure to
trademark-dilution).
121
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
122
See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (“Fame of an opposer’s mark or marks, if it exists, plays a ‘dominant role in the
process of balancing the DuPont factors.”); Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus.,
963 F.2d 350, 353 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“A strong mark . . . casts a long shadow which
competitors must avoid.”); Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115
U.S.P.Q.2d 1816, 1822 (T.T.A.B. 2015) (finding WINEBUD as a mark for wine-related
products confusingly similar to BUD as a mark for beer and noting that “[a]lthough fame is
‘insufficient, standing alone, to establish likelihood of confusion,’ . . . a finding of fame puts
a heavy thumb on Opposer’s side of the scale” (citations omitted)). See generally Barton
Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multi-Factor Test for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF.
L. REV. 1581, 1589 (2006) (describing strength of the mark as one of the four factors most
likely to determine outcomes in likelihood-of-confusion analyses).
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See Beebe, supra note 122, at 1599 (describing how most Circuits view the strength
of a mark and the proximity of the goods as the strongest factors).
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similar features appear in fields “at least broadly . . . related to [the trademark
holder’s] business.”124 As a result, the existence of somewhat similar marks, on
somewhat similar products, can count against a trademark holder in any
infringement suit involving its mark.125 Given this, it’s unsurprising that
trademark holders object when they perceive any encroachment into the space
surrounding their mark. The encroachment may not confuse consumers, and
trademark holders’ failure to object to it may not result in loss of rights in their
mark; but it can affect the value of their trademarks and the scope of their legal
rights going forward. For this reason, Professor McCarthy warns that “[t]he
only way a trademark owner can prevent the market from being crowded with
similar marks is to undertake an assertive program of policing adjacent
‘territory’ and suing those who edge too close.”126 And given the inherent
fuzziness of trademark’s boundaries, judging what comes “too close” can,
itself, be daunting.
I don’t mean to serve as an apologist for overreaching trademark holders. I
have written elsewhere about the costs of expanding trademark rights without
regard to confusion, and I believe that as the effective scope of trademark
rights broadens, both competitors and consumers can suffer. My point here is
that the law has not only failed in its function of delineating clear boundaries
of trademark holder rights; it has arguably made things worse, by defining
trademarks’ value, at least in part, by reference to uses that fall outside any
reasonable definition of those boundaries. Recognizing this reality can help to
put some cases of purported bullying into a different perspective. When a
lawyer for Monster Energy Drinks recommended that the company object to a
124

PostX Corp. v. docSpace Co., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(concluding that marks that “clearly use, to varying degrees, elements of plaintiff’s mark’s
design” by businesses that are “part of a field which at least broadly would include or be
related to plaintiff’s business” weaken plaintiff’s mark); see also One Indus., LLC, v. Jim
O’Neal Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The record, however,
contains several examples of similar O marks used by different companies, including
Oakley, OGIO, and Alloy MX. Such use of other ‘O’ symbols weakens the Rounded O’
mark.”); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1511 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding
weakness of mark demonstrated by evidence that, when applicant sought to register mark,
“there were more than 70 trademark registrations, pending applications for registration or
renewal, or publications-for-opposition that incorporated the term ‘100%,’ and . . . some of
those marks were for cosmetic products” (emphasis added)); Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that evidence
“abundantly established existing third-party use of the name ‘Sun,’ both within and without
the financial community”); JL Beverage Co., v. Beam, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1000 (D.
Nev. 2012) (“When considering whether the senior mark is weakened by its presence in a
‘crowded field’ of similar marks, the relevant field is ‘a field which at least broadly would
include or be related to [the] plaintiff’s business.’”).
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Not all courts follow this rule. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has held that use of
similar marks in unrelated markets is “irrelevant” to infringement analysis. See Eclipse
Assocs. Ltd. v. Data Gen. Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1990).
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MCCARTHY, supra note 46, § 11.91.
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brewery’s sale of Vermonster beer,127 she probably did not perceive any real
risk of confusion or dilution of the Monster Energy marks. But she may well
have concluded that objecting to any drink-related use of monster would help
to preserve the strength of her client’s mark, in general, in future cases.128 This
doesn’t mean that the world is better off as a result of that action; but it does
mean that the accused bully had a plausible reason for its aggression. If we
want to curb that aggression, we should modify trademark law’s incentives.
III. WHAT’S TO BE DONE?
This Essay has contended that three factors—vague legal boundaries, nontransparent enforcement mechanisms, and doctrines that reward aggression—
may be fueling aggressive behavior by trademark and right-of-publicity
claimants. It makes no empirical claim about the existence or frequency of
such overreaching, but in light of these factors, it would come as no surprise if
it turned out to be quite common.
If these three features combine to create an environment conducive to
overreaching, the tweaking any one of them could help, at least around the
edges. In the right-of-publicity context, industries built upon referential
expressive works are virtually crying out for clearer notice about the balance
between publicity rights and creative expression. The prevailing ad hoc
approach for distinguishing between speech and exploitation leaves too much
uncertainty about when the use of individuals’ name, likeness, or identifying
characteristics requires permission. Of course, if certainty alone is the goal,
courts could resolve the situation in either direction, by adopting bright-line
rules that favor either side. A rule that every profit-oriented use of celebrity
identity requires permission, for example, would provide clear notice, though it
would arguably trample time-honored values of free expression. At the other
end, courts could bring greater certainty by adopting a test like Rogers v.
Grimaldi, which involves less subjective balancing and more reliance on
objective questions about the relationship between the individual’s identity and
the expressive work.129

127
Meg Marco, Brewer Sued By Monster Energy Drink Asks America For Help,
CONSUMERIST (Oct. 14, 2009), http://consumerist.com/2009/10/14/brewer-sued-by-monsterenergy-drink-asks-america-for-help/ [https://perma.cc/4BGE-VDYB] (describing how a
small Vermont brewer was sued by the maker of the Monster Energy drink for trademark
infringement for the brewer’s ‘Vermonster’ beer).
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Indeed, in at least one case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a successful trademark
enforcement strategy could make a “crowded field” less crowded. See Abercrombie & Fitch
Co. v. Moose Creek, Inc., 486 F.3d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Abercrombie presented
evidence that its trademark enforcement had resulted in several competitors abandoning
their use of moose images. It was not clearly inconsistent for Abercrombie to assert that the
field is now less crowded.”).
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See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the Rogers standard).
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In the trademark context, there is room for adjustment to all three of the
levers that may contribute to overreaching. First and foremost, courts could
reduce trademark law’s notice failures by clarifying the boundaries of
trademark rights. A variety of tools could achieve this purpose, alone or in
combination. A robust trademark use doctrine, for example, would add
doctrinal clarity by distinguishing between direct and contributory
infringement claims. Furthermore, a materiality requirement would discourage
legal claims for harmless infringement, by discouraging lawsuits over
attenuated risks of confusion over association. Most promisingly, courts could
add rigor and clarity to trademark law’s defenses, carving out categories of
protected use that fall safely beyond trademark holders’ reach. Any level of
increased doctrinal clarity would not only help with the resolution of individual
cases, but it could enable “best practices” initiatives and other efforts that
could empower targets to assess the credibility of cease-and-desist letters and
other legal threats.
Beyond addressing these substantive notice failures, courts, legislatures,
professional organizations, and members of the public can help to influence the
role that cease-and-desist practice plays in contributing to trademark holder
overreaching. Leah Chan Grinvald has demonstrated that public shaming can
play a powerful role in dampening trademark holders’ aggression; in her most
recent article, she has proposed some initiatives designed to curb outrageous
cease-and-desist letters.130 Irina Manta and others have suggested
alternatives.131 To the extent that these efforts can reduce the expected benefit
to trademark holders from sending letters that reflect unreasonable
interpretations of their rights, they can at least partially address the selfreinforcing, ratcheting-up effect of trademark law’s non-transparent
enforcement scheme. And in the registration context, the PTO could consider
adopting policies that discourage unreasonable oppositions—a practice that is
likely to grow in importance in the wake of B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis
Industries Inc.132
Finally, courts should reconsider the doctrines that effectively encourage
trademark holders to reach as broadly as possible in building fences around
their marks. To some extent, these doctrines are intuitive and inevitable. It
makes sense, for example, to allow only weak protection to marks in a very
“crowded field,” because none of the marks is likely to have much sourceidentifying meaning to consumers. But the converse does not necessarily
hold—i.e., that especially strong marks are uniquely vulnerable to confusion or
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See generally Grinvald, supra note 90.
See Manta, supra note 2, at 853 (suggesting that the Patent & Trademark Office make
“preliminary determinations about the validity of infringement claims” so that “trademark
owners could record evidence of policing while being discouraged from making frivolous
claims.”).
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135 S. Ct. 1293, 1310 (2015) (holding that administrative decisions by the Trademark
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dilution, such that they need an extra-broad scope of protection. It may be, in
fact, that the strongest marks are the least vulnerable to confusion or dilution,
because consumers will continue to recognize them, regardless of whether
other parties adopt somewhat similar terms.133 In light of the negative effect
that the “strong marks” preference appears to have on trademark enforcement,
it is worth at least considering whether it is serving a legitimate function.
One recent development might prove important in shifting enforcement
incentives in trademark law. In the wake of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
LLC,134 some courts have begun to soften the presumption of irreparable harm
in trademark suits, instead requiring trademark holders to demonstrate a real
threat of injury.135 If this trend continues, the expected reward from bringing
trademark claims will diminish, because courts may find that minor confusion
rarely threatens meaningful harm.136 If trademark holders are denied injunctive
relief in these cases, they will have less power to influence the use of marks by
third parties that may make consumers think of them, but that do them no
harm. Indeed, we might all be better off in a world in which strong trademarks
had more and better company.
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Tushnet, supra note 120, at 541-42 (“[I]n the dilution experiments, certain-well
known brands [such as Lexis and Hyatt] resist dilution even without reminder ads.”).
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547 U.S. 399 (2005) (holding that the traditional four-factor equitable test applies
when determining whether to award permanent injunctive relief, which includes
demonstrating the suffering of “irreparable harm”).
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to a presumption of irreparable harm when seeking a preliminary injunction and must
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F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We now join other circuits in holding that the eBay
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Indeed, at least in the Ninth Circuit, even a showing of actual consumer confusion
may not be enough to demonstrate irreparable harm. See Williams v. Green Valley RV, Inc.,
No. 8:15-CV-01010-ODW-MRW, 2015 WL 4694075, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2015).

